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INTRODUCTION

An axiom among aspiring law school students is that getting into a top law school
means receiving not only a top-quality education, but also an opportunity for a top-paying
job. And why should they think otherwise? The average starting salary of a Harvard Law
graduate in 2006 lie north of $125,000, while starting salaries for Stanford and USC
averaged out at $125,000 and $135,000-plus. In some cities, fully loaded compensation
for new law graduates in large firms can lie in the range of $180,000 to $200,000 (Bower,
2007). Many professionals in the law community claim that “names open doors,” viewing
the reputation of the law school one attends as a key to a world of lucrative professional
opportunities.
However, getting into a great law school is far from easy and arguably more than
just difficult. The fact is that all of the top institutions hold extremely high standards for
admission, requiring an applicant to not only have a stellar undergraduate performance,
but to score very competitively on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). The LSAT
is a timed standardized test required for admission to all American Bar Association(ABA) approved law schools, and many non-ABA-approved law schools. It provides a
standard measure of acquired reading and verbal reasoning skills that law schools use to
measure an applicant’s current abilities as well as to ascertain their potential performance
in law school. A common practice for law schools is to use student’s LSAT scores and
undergraduate grade point averages (UGPAs) in a weighted sum to generate an admission
index.
Indeed, a high undergraduate UGPA may indicate a given applicant’s ability to win
the war, so to speak, but the LSAT tests for the applicant’s alacrity on the field of battle.
If legal institutions endorse LSAT scores and UGPAs as accurate assessments of ability,
to what extent does “ability” influence wages in the legal job market? Do average salaries
of graduates of top schools justify these schools’ lofty admittance standards? Earning a
law degree does not automatically grant its holder the right to practice law; in fact, it is
essentially a prerequisite for consideration by the professional organization that regulates
the law profession in any given jurisdiction. Upon earning a law degree, aspirants must
slay yet another mighty dragon, the bar exam. Given that certain law schools require
excellent LSAT scores and GPAs, does graduation from these schools precede high bar
2
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passage rates? Using empirical evidence containing average LSAT scores, UGPAs,
starting salaries, and bar passage rates, I will implement Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) to evaluate relative efficiency levels across 35 law schools in the Pacific West and
Mountain zones, including the states of Washington, Oregon, California, Utah, Arizona,
Colorado, and Montana.1
An interesting preface to an inquiry into law school performance, given the input
criteria selected for this study, is the general notion of predictive validity. Within the
thicket of social sciences, a branch of psychology particularly interested in measuring
predictive validity is the field of psychometrics.2 In the interest of theory and technique,
psychometricians attempt to construct instruments and procedures for educational and
psychological measurement. The Stanford-Binet IQ test, originally developed by the
French psychologist Alfred Binet, represents a well-known outcome of such efforts.
Though the IQ test has achieved household name popularity, the test has come under fire
or deemed inadequate for several reasons, including environmental discrepancies and
individualistic factors. Regardless, the IQ test has remained a widely regarded yardstick
of intelligence assessment.
Similarly, there have been concerns that the LSAT may be inaccurate or not fully
representative of a given subject’s academic potential, particularly with a heterogeneous
applicant pool (Fagan, 2002). A prevalent criticism is that the LSAT merely tests
someone’s ability to take a test under tightly girded time constraints. Yet, despite the
negative press, all ABA-approved law schools continue to utilize the LSAT as a key
component in their respective admissions processes. Normatively speaking, the
touchstone for a given standardized test score must be its ability to consistently predict
some important future outcome; the word “standardized” most certainly implies
consistency. As well, an ideal university admissions process should be one comprised of
a rigorous meritocratic system, selecting only the most auspicious students, with no
regard for demographics or socio-economic background. While the LSAT’s accuracy
may be questionable, the bottom line is that most law schools trust the predictive validity
1

The central Pacific Ocean area, i.e. Hawaii has been omitted for simplification purposes.
“The branch of psychology that deals with the design, administration, and interpretation of
quantitative tests for the measurement of psychological variables such as intelligence, aptitude,
and personality traits. Also called psychometry” (Psychometrics, n.d.)

2
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of the test, viewing LSAT scores as indicative of future academic success and an
admitted student’s ability to contribute to institutional prestige.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A large amount of literature exists which examines academic performance and
academic success prediction. In 1995, John W. Young contributed a report to the
“Educational and Psychological Measurement” bimonthly journal entitled, “A
Comparison of Two Adjustment Methods for Improving the Prediction of Law School
Grades.” Young (1995) wrote, “[c]riticisms about the effectiveness of preadmission
measures generally focus only on the limitations of the predictors” (p.559). As the title
suggests, Young (1995) sought to detect any changes in the predictive validity of the
LSAT on law school performance when the criterion was changed from first-year grade
point average (GPA) to the cumulative GPA (1995). He suggested that many predictive
validity studies were inherently limited due their reliance on first year GPA as the
criterion. Institutional studies favored first year GPAs because they are easy to obtain and
are a well-defined criterion (1995). Further, cumulative GPAs contain “noise” generated
by unique grade distributions of the varying combinations of courses taken by students
(1995).
Young (1995) viewed the first-year GPA criterion as “neither a sufficient nor [an]
adequate measure of a student’s overall achievement” and suggested that a cumulative
GPA would offer more advantages (1995, p.559). Thus, he proposed using a previously
validated grade adjustment method to correct for the interruptive nature of the cumulative
GPA. Young (1995) was the first to use his method in a study on post-graduate
performance.
Young (1995) obtained data from four accredited U.S. law schools, choosing one
school from the West (School A), one from the South (School B), and two from the
Northeast (C and D, respectively). Three of the schools were public and one private.
Using item response theory (IRT) and the (statistical) general linear model (GLM),
Young (1995) generated figures that equated grades from different course (using a rating
scale) and displayed optimizing characteristics of the least squares approach.

4
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The results of Young’s grade adjustment methods were minor, indicating that the
correlation of predictive validity of the LSAT was only slightly improved (1995). Young
(1995) attributed the low improvement to the similarity of the law courses taken by the
students. In other words, previous efforts using the same adjustment methods yielded
greater results because of the greater variation in chosen courses among undergrad
students. In law school, everyone essentially takes the same courses. Thus, correlation
improvements based on course differences “would likely have little impact in changing
the relative rankings of students” (Young, 1995, p.570). School D (from the Northeast)
displayed an 83 percent greater correlation between LSAT and future performance than
the other three schools. Young (1995) explained this disparity emphasizing that School D
had a significantly higher variation of LSAT scores than the other three schools.

Note on Capital

There exists an interesting relationship between Young’s research and my
forthcoming efficiency analysis. Young’s report examines the predictive validity and
correlation of standardized testing (LSAT) and UGPA with law school success. In my
analysis of law schools, I will utilize the same “predictors” or academic capital
measurements as Young; however, the criteria by which the predictors or “inputs” are
measured render my project unique. The essence of the project will be in analyzing how
law schools handle admitted individuals’ qualifications (given the specific criteria), and
how an efficient or inefficient cultivation of student talents serves these individuals in the
professional job market. Law school graduates fresh onto the legal job scene are
presumably endowed with high levels of job search-type as well as industry-specific
human capital; the respective school they attend no doubt cultivates the former while
signaling the latter (to varying degrees). Both the job search and industry-specific skill
sets are likely to render constituents suitable for significant measures of success in the
types of professional work environments to which they aspire. For the purposes of this
analysis, it is assumed that the graduates of the sample law schools harbor the type of
forward-trajectory mindset that not only allows them to thrive professionally, but to
discourage questions about sub-par individual performance effects on labor market
outcomes. Regarding the law schools, it is unlikely that the results of this analysis will
5
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reveal the extent to which a given school’s reputation capital influences a law school
graduate’s job prospects; however, it is doubtful that a given school’s reputation has no
bearing on an employment outcome.

RESEARCH METHOD

The relationship between efficiency and production is a crucial aspect of
performance in an industry. The survival of an entrant to a given industry often depends
on that decision-making unit’s (DMU’s) ability to achieve a competitive output while
operating at an efficient level of production. M.J. Farrell (1957) viewed the relationship
between efficiency and production as critical to both economic theory and economic
policy, stating, “if economic planning is to concern itself with particular industries, it is
important to know how far a given industry can be expected to increase its output by
simply increasing its efficiency, without absorbing further resources” (p.11).
For the purpose of taking efficiency measurements, Farrell (1957) introduced the
idea of measuring relative technical efficiency by establishing benchmark firms (efficient
DMUs in the industry), and then comparing inefficient firms to them. Charnes, Cooper,
and Rhodes (1978) expanded Farrell’s idea by introducing a linear programming method
called data envelopment analysis (DEA).

Advantages of DEA

Since its inception, DEA has become a popular management tool. Among the
various approaches to measuring productivity and efficiency, DEA offers some
advantages. For example, unlike multiple regression analysis, DEA does not require the
estimation of a production function. As well, DEA allows for the evaluation of the
efficiency of a number of producers. Statistical approaches rely on a comparison of
inefficient producers to some average hypothetical producer. The extreme point
technique of DEA, however, compares inefficient firms to actual “best” firms while
accounting for differing input combinations or “technologies”.
Inherent in the relative measurement approach of DEA is a unique flexibility. DEA
provides an adaptable approach to assessing performance in cases where maximizing
6
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profit or revenue is not the main goal. For example, the behavior of public sector DMU’s,
where empire-building3 tendencies are likely present (Rosen & Gayer, 2008), might not
be conducive to a performance measurement based on profit or revenue. To be sure, the
flexibility of DEA is critical to the endeavor of measuring law school efficiency based on
starting salary and bar passage criterions.

Data Requirements

An important assumption behind DEA is that if a given firm, say DMU1, can
produce ya units of output using xa inputs, then other DMU’s using the same combination
and intensity of inputs should be capable of the same feat. Likewise, if DMU2 can
produce yb units of output using xb inputs, then other DMU’s using the same input
combination should be capable of similar production. Combinations of DMU1, DMU2,

(and any other efficient producers), form virtual or composite producers to which actual
DMUs are compared. If an actual DMU does not fare well compared to its most relevant
virtual producer (e.g., uses more inputs to produce the same output as the virtual
producer), then the actual producer is inefficient.
The software used in this study, “OnFront,” authored by Färe & Grosskopf (2000)
and published by the EMQ Corporation, identifies benchmark observations and
constructs a “best practice frontier” to which other observations are compared (p.2). In
this paper, the outputs of law schools are the focus, meaning that the best practice frontier
will be the output set which is constructed using observations of outputs, given inputs.
Färe & Grosskopf (2000) define the frontier as being constructed using any number
of inputs (x) and outputs (y):

(N) Different types of inputs (expressed individually):

x n , n = 1,..., N

(M) Different types of outputs (expressed individually):

y m , m = 1,..., M

3

William A. Niskanen Jr. suggested that power and status are positively correlated with the size of a
bureaucrat’s budget and that the bureaucrat’s objective is to maximize his or her budget, resulting in
oversupply of service.

7
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Accordingly, the analysis of law school efficiency will only require the observation
of two different measurable outputs;

y1 (first time taker bar passage rate)
y 2 (average starting salary).
Continuing with the notation used by Färe & Grosskopf (2000), the following
expression defines the number of DMU’s observed;
k = 1,..., K .
This means that there are K different law schools being observed. Observations in
the study will include information on all inputs and outputs, conveniently expressed as

x k = ( x k 1 ,..., x kN )

and

y k = ( y k 1 ,..., y kM ) .

In summary, the output possibilities set can be expressed as

P ( x | C , S ) = {( y1 ,..., y M ) :
K

∑z

k

y km ≥ y m , m = 1,..., M ,

k

x kn ≤ y n , n = 1,..., N ,

k =1
K

∑z
k =1

z k ≥ 0, k = 1,..., K }.
Best Practice Technology
There are three ways to express best practice technology:
•

Input Requirement Set L(y) that shows all the combinations of

inputs that can

be used to produce the output vector y,
•

Output Requirement Set P(x) which shows all the combinations of outputs that
can be produced by the input vector x.

8
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•

Graph GR which shows the combinations of inputs x and outputs y that are
technically feasible.
(Färe & Grosskopf, 2000, p.3)

As stated previously, the outputs used in this study are first-time taker bar pass rates
and first-year average starting salaries of graduates from 35 law schools in Pacific West
and Mountain zones of the U.S. The inputs used are UGPA and average LSAT scores of
students entering these institutions. Given that this study relies on inputs that function on
the consumer preference concept of “non-satiation” (i.e., students should strive to achieve
excellent marks), the goal here is not to seek out substitutes or lower degrees of inputs
but to increase measured outputs given “high” or in this case, success-driven inputs. To
focus on squeezing a high salary and a good shot at passing a state bar exam through
substandard undergraduate grades and a mediocre LSAT score would simply be an
exercise in futility. However, in the event that this study yields worthy or reliable results,
a prospective law student with sub-par undergraduate performance could “shop around”
for an institution that scored well and that endorses an admissions requirement feasible
for that student.
The bottom line is that output-based

Table 1.

efficiency measurements are far more

School
(DMU)

Input
x

Output 1
y1

Output 2
y2

appropriate when dealing with the inputs

A
B
C

1
1
1

2
1
1

1
2
1

and outputs used in this study. Table 1,
(right) presents an example output set.

Using the data in Table 1, the best practice technology may be expressed as
P (1 | C , S ) = {( y1 , y 2 ) :
z A ⋅ 2 + z B ⋅ 1 + z C ⋅ 1 ≥ y1
z A ⋅1 + z B ⋅ 2 + zC ⋅1 ≥ y2
z A ⋅1 + z B ⋅1 + zC ⋅1 ≤ x
z A , z B , z C ≥ 0}

9
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The idea is not to decrease inputs, but to expand outputs; therefore, the study of law
school efficiency here uses Farrell-type output efficiency measurement.
The Farrell Output-Oriented Measure of Technical Efficiency is expressed as
follows:
F0 ( x, y | C , S ) = max{θ : θy ∈ P ( x | C , S )}.
Linear Programming
Analyzing the efficiency of K producers is then a set of N linear programming
problems. The OnFront software uses the linear programming technique introduced by
Charnes et al (1978) to find the best virtual producer. The linear programming problem to
be solved in school C in Table 1 is
Fo ( x, y | C , S ) = Fo (1,1,1, | C , S ) max θ
s.t.
z A ⋅ 2 + z B ⋅1 + zC ⋅1 ≥ θ1
z A ⋅1 + z B ⋅ 2 + zC ⋅1 ≥ θ1
z A ⋅1 + z B ⋅1 + zC ⋅1 ≤ 1
z A , z B , z C ≥ 0}
The maximum value of θ is the producer's
efficiency. The z values create the inefficient

y2

DMU’s distance from the appropriate actual
DMU(s) to which it is compared. Solving the
above inequalities for optimal values of the z’s
and θ. by first equating the observed DMU to

2


2



C



1







θ*C
1

zero, then substituting appropriate z values, results
in the Farrell-type output efficiency level for the
particular observation. Any value θ > 1, as in the
case with observation C in Figure 1, indicates an

0

1

2

y1

Figure 1

inefficient level of output; θ = 1 is efficient, i.e., the school lies on the best practice
frontier.
10
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Output Slack
Given the radial symmetry of the best
practice frontier, there is a possibility for DMUs
to have what is called “output slack” (Färe &
Grosskopf, 2000, p.24). What this amounts to is

y2
2

A




C

that firms may be technically efficient (DEA score
of 1) and lie on the best practice frontier, yet there

2




1







1

is room to increase one type of output using the
same

combination

of

inputs.

A

visual

0

1

2

y1

representation of this idea is observed in Figure 2.
Point ‘A’ lies on the best practice frontier but

Figure 2

should be capable of increasing its output of y1. As mentioned earlier, DMUs in a sample
are all compared to actual best DMUs, represented in Figure 2 by points 1 and 2. In
addition to providing Farrell output efficiency scores, the OnFront software may also
generate “dual values” and “z-variables.” The duals may indicate that a particular DMU
contains output slack, while the z-variables represent a given DMU’s comparison values,
which in turn may be used to calculate said slack.

According to Fare and Grosskopf (2000), “[t]here is Slack in output y m for firm k’ if
K

∑z

k

y km > y k 'm ⋅ Fo ( x k ' , y k ' | C , S ),

k =1

is true for some solution value for z k , k = 1,..., K ” (p.25). In the case of measuring law
school efficiency in the manner presented in this study, a law school with some amount
of output slack would mean that either its LSAT averages or UGPAs could theoretically
be decreased while maintaining the established salary and bar passage output.
Virtually every quantitative analysis of data involves some sort of graphical
analysis. However, under the circumstances of this study, a two-dimensional graphical
representation of DEA results is inappropriate because the data used requires fourdimension.

11
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In summary, the basic features of the data in this study are:
•

(x1) input 1 – average Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores of
entering students.

•

(x2) input 2 – average undergrad grade point averages (UGPA) of entering
students.

•

(y1) output 1 – average starting salaries of law school graduates.

•

(y2) output 2 – first-time taker state bar exam passage rates of graduates.

•

F0 ( x, y | C , S ) = max{θ : θy ∈ P ( x | C , S )} Farrell Output-Oriented Measure
of Technical Efficiency

•

Sample – data on 35 U.S. law schools from the Pacific West and Mountain
zones used for study.

DATA DESCRIPTION

Data used in this study, including LSAT scores, UGPAs, first-time taker bar
passage rates, career placement information, and average starting salaries, is
representative of the 2006 academic year and was obtained from “The Princeton Review”
web site. The Princeton Review (2007), similar to Kaplan, Inc., has long been associated
with student transition into higher education, including graduate, medical, business, and
law schools. The Princeton review has divisions in test preparation (SAT, ACT, GMAT,
MCAT, LSAT, GRE, USMLE), K-12 programs, and admissions services. Many college
admissions offices use Princeton Review resources to introduce their schools to interested
students and augment their applicant pool (Princeton, 2007). The National Association
for College Admission Counseling (NCAC), an organization of more than 9,800
professionals from around the world, endorses The Princeton Review as an ethical and
socially responsible service for students in the transition process (National, 2007).
As discussed earlier, DEA requires both input and output quantities. Standard
microeconomic theory uses labor and capital as production inputs. This study uses LSAT
scores and UGPAs of entering law school students as proxies for the standard input
measures. Conveniently, no prior calculations were required in preparing input data for
use in the OnFront software. The output measures, which include first-time taker bar
12
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passage rates, average starting salaries, and public interest/government sector practice,
also required no additional preparation. However, the output measures do betoken a
particular technical caveat. The upper-bound nature of the bar passage rates as well as the
individual schools’ percentages of public interest- and government sector-bound
graduates should be addressed. While some graduating classes do actually “achieve” a
100 percent bar passage rate, the majority do not. In 2006 (the data year for this study), 3
out of 181 ABA-approved law schools (1.6 percent) achieved the 100 percent status
(Princeton, 2007). None of the schools observed in this study accomplished 100 percent
passage.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the input and output data based on the
original bar passage and average salary output criterions. An item to note is the higher
mean LSAT and UGPA of public versus private schools and the perhaps correlative
higher average bar pass rates and first year salaries. Another item to note is the range of
values in Table 2. Private schools posses a greater range of LSAT, UGPA, and bar pass
values compared to public schools. One possible explanation might be a higher
selectivity of private schools than that of public schools, i.e., admissions criteria that
weigh some factors, other than LSAT and UGPA values, higher than the average public
school admissions criteria. The 2006 acceptance rate for the private schools in this study
was 33.6 percent; for public schools, the acceptance rate was 27.7 percent.
If we are to give credence to the widely held belief that private schools are “highly
selective” or “tough to get into,” the higher acceptance rate coupled with the broader
range of acceptable LSAT and UGPA figures of this study, indicates that there must be
private institutions that value non-LSAT/UGPA acceptance criteria more than some
public schools. Interestingly, a higher selectivity characteristic generally makes a positive
statement about an institution, often adding to a given school’s highly valued prestige and
boosting its reputation capital. Average starting salary ranges between public and private
schools remain similar, though public schools have a higher average starting salary than
private schools.
Law school graduates entering public interest or government sector areas of law
practice do so with the knowledge that these areas are generally much lower paying than
private or business sector practices. In fact, many schools offer incentive programs that
facilitate “loan forgiveness” in exchange for some degree of commitment to the public
13
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sector. In consideration of these pay disparities, an additional “output” measure
representing percentages of law school graduates entering public interest or government
law employment is factored into the analysis and a summary of the individual
percentages is depicted in Table 3. The intention here is not to change the direction of the
study, nor abandon the original research question, but simply to add an interesting
dimension to the results, and hopefully augment any possible relationships between
LSAT scores, UGPAs, and legal job market prospects.

DEA RESULTS

As previously mentioned, the most appropriate DEA approach for this study is the
Farrell-type output efficiency computation. Therefore, the “best practice” DMUs will be
those that receive a score of θ = 1 . DMUs with scores θ > 1 are said to “inefficient.” A
simple calculation of θ − 1 will give the percent inefficiency of a given DMU. Table 5
shows the efficiency score data, comparing private school performance to public school
performance using starting salaries and first-time taker bar passage rates as outputs
(left column) as well as public interest/government percentages and first year starting
salaries as outputs (right column).
First, public schools show a better average efficiency score than private schools.
One thing to note is that many California “state” law schools reside in nearby business
and commerce hotbeds, where many large private firms flourish, and regularly recruit at
these schools. The high salaries of graduates of some of these state schools no doubt
improve the overall DEA performance of public schools overall. Another item to note is
the efficiency range of private schools with salary and bar passage as outputs. Table 5
shows that the public efficiency maximum is 0.78 points below (i.e., better than) the
private efficiency score. One possible explanation for this relatively wide efficiency
range is the private schools’ broad range of acceptable LSAT and UGPA figures.
Referring back to Table 2, private schools show an LSAT score range of 151–170, and a
UGPA range of 3.12–3.83, compared to the public school LSAT score range of 152–166,
and UGPA range of 3.32–3.75. Regarding outputs, private schools show a greater range
in both average starting salaries and bar passage rates. The minimum bar passage rate for
private schools (35 percent) is 30 percent lower than the public school minimum. Also,

14
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noteworthy is the private school range of bar passage rates. While public schools have a
range of 30 percentage points, private schools show a range of 59 percentage points.
In August 2005, the American Bar Association placed two California law schools
on a two-year probationary period due to poor bar passage rates. Whittier Law School,
located in Costa Mesa and San Francisco-based Golden Gate School of Law (both private
institutions) continue to display low bar passage achievements as indicated by the 2006
data observed in this study. Given that these schools have significantly lower LSAT and
UGPA requirements, there is some indication that LSAT and UGPA endowment have an
influence on subsequent bar passage figures.
Viewing Table 5 again, the mean efficiency scores of public and private schools as
computed using public interest/government practice percentages and starting salaries as
outputs, are virtually identical. Given the salary/bar output criteria, public schools display
a wider range of efficiency scores than do private schools; immediately noticeable is the
significantly higher (less efficient) public school maximum. As determined in Table 6
(below), public schools fill a higher percentage of public interest and government sector
jobs than do private schools, which places downward pressure on average starting
salaries, thus “weakening” the efficiency score of public schools.
Important to note here is that while
public interest and government sector
percentages do tend to pull down average
starting salaries, the share of graduates
pursuing these areas comprise a minority. In
fact, a sweeping majority of law school
graduates seeks out private or business
sector positions; other “less favored” fields
include academia and judicial clerkships.
Whether public schools encourage students
interested in public sector work more so
than private schools is not immediately
evident. In any event, Table 2 shows that the
public school mean starting salary is

Table 6. Percent of Graduates Entering
Public Interest/Gov. Practice
Mean
Public
Private
All
st. dev
Public
Private
All
Min
Public
Private
All
Max
Public
Private
All

18
15.65
16.86
5.72
5.59
5.7
9
5
5
31
25
31

significantly higher than the private school mean.
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Table’s 3 provides statistics for “efficient” law schools with Farrell output
efficiency scores of 1 to 1.1 and Table 4 depicts “inefficient” schools with efficiency
scores of 1.2 and above4. Table 3 reveals that efficient private and public LSAT scores,
UGPAs, starting salaries, and bar passage rates closely resemble one another with only
slight deviations. Given the arbitrary efficient score range, efficient public schools show a
lower LSAT score average but slightly higher UGPA figure than private schools,
indicating that a equally efficient DEA score was achieved with slightly “less” of the
LSAT input, but slightly more of the UGPA input. Concerning outputs, private schools
show both a higher mean bar passage rate as well as higher mean starting salaries, which
signals once more that LSAT scores perhaps influence bar passage rates. Table 4 shows
that “inefficient” public schools have a higher LSAT average and UGPA figure than
private schools, though private schools. While private and public average starting salaries
are virtually identical, the corresponding bar passage rates are not. Considering that
inefficient private schools display lower LSAT, UGPA, and bar passage rates than public
schools in the inefficient category, the notion that LSAT scores and UGPAs influence bar
passage is once again raised.
As previously mentioned, “output slack” can occur when a particular DMU is
technically efficient (DEA score of 1) yet there is room to increase one type of output
using the same combination of inputs. In this analysis for example, Lewis and Clark Law
School shows in its corresponding duals value that it contains slack due to its LSAT (x1)
input figure. In the analysis, Lewis and Clark’s comparison schools are Stanford (average
LSAT of 170) and University of New Mexico (average LSAT of 155). The corresponding
z-variables representing this comparison relationship are 0.33 (Stanford) and 0.6 (New
Mexico) which essentially means that Lewis and Clark is being compared to New
Mexico more so it is being compared to Stanford. The Output slack calculation is as
follows:
170(.033) + 155(0.6) = 149.1
Lewis and Clark’s LSAT average is 160, so the output slack is (160-149.1) = 10.9
points. In other words, the average LSAT score for Lewis and Clark could technically be
4

Truly efficient firms are those with a DEA score value of 1. For the purposes of analysis, an arbitrary
range of efficiency and inefficiency has been chosen in order to provide an adequate sample in which to
derive additional descriptive statistics.
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approximately 149, given Lewis and Clark’s average starting salaries and first time taker
bar passage rates.

SUMMARY

To revisit the question posed at the beginning; Do high LSAT scores precede high
bar passage rates? According to the above results, LSAT scores may affect bar passage
rates. Using dual values and z-variables to compute the output slack of relevant DMUs, it
was revealed that certain average starting salaries should technically be feasible given a
“smaller” input value, or LSAT score. When viewing Table 3, DMUs in a relatively high
efficiency range display a correlation between high LSAT scores/ UGPAs and high bar
passage achievements. At the upper end of the spectrum, these good scores translate into
high starting salaries. However, “inefficient” private schools show a broader LSAT range
and lower minimum than public schools but maintain a higher average salary than
“inefficient” public schools. Do average starting salaries of top school graduates justify
these schools aggressive LSAT and UGPA admissions standards? Perhaps this is a
subjective question. This DEA project indicates that LSAT scores influence both starting
salary and bar passage rates in the efficiency range of 1 to 1.1, and only affect the bar
passage rates in the 1.2 and above range.

U.S. News Law School Rankings

Law schools generate an admission index using LSAT and UGPA in order to
“rank” applications and thus expedite the admission process. It is likely that admitted
students experience (to varying degrees) an intensified version of such a meritocratic
system within the walls of the institution. However, are law schools ardent proponents of
law school ranking systems, such as the U.S. News and World Report’s “Best Graduate
Schools”? On the surface, law schools show an aversion to the rankings or “lists.” In
1997, 150 law school deans signed a joint letter denouncing the U.S. News rankings; the
following year, the Association for American Law Schools commissioned a study calling
the validity of the publication’s rankings into question. The much-maligned yet widely
read list has no doubt stirred up a lot of controversy, yet is influences “decisions that are
17
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central to the academic enterprise – decisions about resources allocation, faculty hiring,
curriculum, and so on” (Grossman, 2004, para.48).
Regardless of any dissension they engender, the U.S. News rankings do tend to
represent some measure of validity, i.e., they serve as an impetus for concrete decisions
made by law schools, and they affect decisions of applicants (where to apply, matriculate,
or transfer). How do the DEA output efficiency scores obtained in my study compare to

U.S. News law school rankings? Twenty-three of the thirty-five law schools observed in
this study placed in the “Top 100 Law Schools” list. Figure 3, shown below, clearly
depicts a significant correlation between the two measures.
Figure 3. U.S. News Rank / DEA Output Efficiency Scores

100
90
80
Rank (Top 100)

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0.95
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1.25

1.3

1.35

Efficiency Score

What, if anything, does the s the relationship between DEA output efficiency
scores (using the selected input/output criteria) and the U.S. News rankings reveal? There
are two important considerations to put forth. First, the DEA study revealed that in the
case of “inefficient” privates schools (Table 4), LSAT scores and UGPA less affect the
starting salary figure. Second, the U.S. News list places significant emphasis (40 percent)
on law school reputation. Ceteris paribus, there are likely some factors other than the
merit of the individual(s) that enables the pool of observed private schools to maintain an
average starting salary higher than that of “inefficient” public schools. The correlation
between the two scores may reveal (and confirm the intuition) that a school’s reputation
plays a key role in the placement of a graduate, and to some extent, the graduates starting
salary.
18
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APPENDIX
Table 2. Input and Output Quantities (2006)

Mean
Public
Private
All
st. dev
Public
Private
All
Min (25th percentile)
Public
Private
All
Max (75th percentile)
Public
Private
All

BAR (y1)

SALARY (y2)

LSAT (x1)

UGPA (x2)

80.89
69.55
76.59

74971
69517
72902

160
158
159

3.5
3.357
3.447

8.1
17.99
13.67

24698.26
24260.33
24244.84

4
5
5

0.133
0.210
0.177

65
35
35

41063
50000
41063

152
151
151

3.32
3.12
3.12

95
94
95

125000
135000
135000

166
170
170

3.75
3.83
3.83
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APPENDIX
Table 3. Input and Output Quantities of Efficient DMUs: DEA Scores [1, 1.10]

Mean
Public
Private
All
st. dev
Public
Private
All
Min (25th percentile)
Public
Private
All
Max (75th percentile)
Public
Private
All

BAR (y1)

SALARY (y2)

LSAT (x1)

UGPA (x2)

88
90
88

84209
89094
85541

162
164
163

3.59
3.56
3.58

4.34
5.86
4.55

30077.17
42721.91
31677.81

3.65
6.51
4.27

0.12
0.31
0.17

81
83
81

48818
50500
48818

155
157
155

3.34
3.23
3.23

95
94
95

125000
135000
135000

166
170
170

3.75
3.83
3.83
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APPENDIX
Table 4. Input and Output Quantities of Inefficient DMUs: DEA Scores [1.25, ∞)

Mean
Public
Private
All
st. dev
Public
Private
All
Min (25th percentile)
Public
Private
All
Max (75th percentile)
Public
Private
All

BAR (y1)

SALARY (y2)

LSAT (x1)

UGPA (x2)

72
56
60

66289
66938
66765

159
156
157

3.38
3.26
3.29

4.99
14.81
14.59

15391
12058
12438

2.52
3.45
3.36

0.06
0.15
0.14

65
35
35

48816
50000
48816

155
151
151

3.32
3.00
3.00

76
74
76

83000
86451
86451

161
161
161

3.44
3.50
3.50
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APPENDIX
Table 5. Farrell-type Output Efficiency Scores (summary)

Fo(x, y | C,S)

Fo(x, y | C,S)

SALARY (y1)/ BAR (y2)

Mean
Public
Private
All
st. dev
Public
Private
All
Min (25th

PUB./GOV. (y1) / SALARY (y2)

1.1350
1.3547
1.2417

1.2505
1.2582
1.2543

0.8979
0.3001
0.2425

0.2547
0.1509
0.2076

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

1.3000
2.0800
2.0800

1.9200
1.4600
1.9200

percentile)

Public
Private
All

Max (75th
percentile)

Public
Private
All
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